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I. SCOPE
With the advent of the Supreme Court's holding in the recent
* J.D. 1968, Rutgers Law School. Assistant Deputy Public Defender
for the State of New Jersey; Special Consultant to the New Jersey Criminal
Law Revision Commission.
case of In re Gault, there has evolved a serious question con-
cerning the constitutionality of the generally prevailing practice
of compelling a parent, under threat of contempt, to testify
against his child in a juvenile delinquency proceeding when his
child has confided to the parent his involvement in the conduct
charged. In Gault, the Court held that a juvenile has a privilege
against self-incrimination in the fact-finding phase of the juvenile
delinquency hearing.2 A court, by compelling the juvenile's par-
ent to testify concerning matters which the juvenile could not
be forced to divulge, indirectly causes the juvenile to incriminate
himself solely because of a natural, but regrettably mistaken, belief
on his part that his conversations with his parent are private.8
Such surreptitious judicial practices should be proscribed. The
question remains, however, as to what is the most effective yet
practical method 4 of achieving this proscription. This Article will
analyze the feasibility of creating5 a privilege for confidential com-
munications made by a juvenile to a parent and will offer a statute
by which to codify such a privilege. Since no such independent
privilege exists at the present time, it will be necessary to analyze
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 37.
3. Although it is absurd to assume in every case that a child has
actually considered his conversation to be "confidential" and has relied
upon that confidentiality, it would be equally unreasonable to assume that
the child made the statement in total awareness of the fact that it was not
confidential.
4. "Practicality" must be given considerable emphasis because the
most effective method of achieving this desired result may also be the
most expensive or the most difficult to administer.
5. But see Mandelbaum, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Anglo-American and Jewish Law, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 115 (1956), where the
author notes in a discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination that
the:
[Sitatement [by the early Jewish courts] that "a person cannot
accuse himself" was subject to various interpretations. Some Jew-
ish scholars regarded such a prohibition as linked to the Biblical
rule which excluded a kinsman from testifying in a suit involving
another kinsman. "If a person cannot testify against his brother,
how could we allow his testimony against himself?"
Id. at 117 (emphasis added). It should be noted that such a "privilege" as
is proposed here is presently recognized in Continental Europe. See Note,
The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 208 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note]:
According to Bodington's translation of the French Civil Code,
it is provided in Article 268 that "No one can be summoned as a
witness if he is a blood relation, or relative by marriage in direct
line,. . . of one of the parties .... "
[Thus], the following are incompetent [to testify as witnesses]
at criminal trials: Father, mother, grandfather, grandson, grand-
daughter, brothers, sisters, brothers and sisters-in-law, and the
husband and wife of the accused, even if divorced.
Id. at 211 n.16 (emphasis added). See also BODINGTON, FRENCH LAW OF
EVIDENCE 118 (1904); Quick, Self-Incrimination under the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 3 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1956): "The Continental privilege against
self-incrimination . . . embraces not only disgraceful conduct but also a




both the historical and actual justifications and functioning of es-
tablished privileges.
II. BACKGROUND
The recent and continuing trend of United States Supreme
Court decisions expanding the scope of "due process of law," as
evidenced in Mapp v. Ohio,6 Gideon v. Wainwright,7 Malloy v.
Hogan," Escobedo v. Illinois,9 and Miranda v. Arizona,10 provided
the constitutional precursors for the Court's initial entrance into
the realm of the juvenile court system in the case of Kent v.
United States.1 In Kent, the Court held that a juvenile must be
given "proper notice" of the fact that a delinquency hearing is to
occur as a result of which the juvenile may be taken into "protec-
tive custody," a more innocuous phrase for incarceration in the
state reformatory. In addition, the Court declared that such a
juvenile must be clearly advised of his previously non-existent
right to be represented by counsel at such a hearing. Anticipating
opposition to its decision, the Court noted that the right to counsel
is of the "essence of justice."1 2 The Court soon expanded juvenile
rights by its decision in the landmark case of In re Gault.13 In
Gault, for the first time the Supreme Court directly confronted
the critical question of whether a juvenile in a delinquency pro-
ceeding is entitled to the benefits of the expanded concept of fun-
damental "procedural due process." In reversing the decision of
the Arizona Supreme Court,14 the United States Supreme Court
explicitly declared that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is [restricted to] adults alone."15
III. ExISTING PRIVILEGES
A. Introductory Comments
The word "privilege" stems from the Latin phrase privata lex,
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For an excellent discussion of this "revolu-
tion" see Note, Escobedo in the Courts: May Anything You Say Be Held
Against You?, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 111 (1964).
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Comment, Miranda Guarantees in
the California Juvenile Court, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 114 (1966).
11. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
12. Id. at 561.
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
15. 387 U.S. at 13.
a prerogative given to a particular person or class of persons.16
There are three distinct types of privileges, each based upon a com-
bination of social and legal rationales. First, there are privileges
designed to protect the rights of the individual. Privileges of this
type include the privilege against having evidence admitted which
has been unconstitutionally acquired,17 and the more familiar priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. 1  The second type of privilege
is composed of privileges designed to protect the maintenance of
our Government. Examples of this type of privilege are the in-
former's privilege,'9 the privilege of government secrets, and the
privileges designed to insure the inviolability of our judicial sys-
tem. The third type of privilege consists of privileges designed
to be "a significant expression of the law's concern or regard for
the security of the individual as a participant in relationships
which the state considers it important to foster and protect and,
it should be added, for the security and sanctity of the relationship
16. See Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Priv-
ilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 181 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Slovenko]. In
addition, the early Roman law recognized the rule of testimonium do-
mesticum which provided that parents, children, patrons, freedman, and
slaves were prohibited by the Lex lulia from being compelled to give
testimony against each other. The rationale underlying this privilege
was not directly related to self-incrimination but rather against the cor-
ruption of the intra-familial relations which would ensue by making un-
certain and suspicious what was instinctively assumed to demand the
most unrestricted confidence or uberrima fides, the sanctity of the family
based on mutual fidelity. Thus, it is not surprising that the specific
policy of uberrima fides was consistently deemed superior to the general
policy of the law, i.e., the correct settlement of controversies or the punish-
ment of offenders. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communica-
tions Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928). Interest-
ingly, the author made the observation that:
The real fact is that, whether we admit it or not, the Roman and
the Medieval attitudes are [still] very much in our bones. We,
too, think that the relationships based on mutual fidelity are val-
uable constituents of our society, and we do not relish the idea of
disturbing them even to aid the processes of formal justice.
Id. at 492. But see Hutchins and Schlesinger, Some Observations On the
Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929):
This conception of the home as a unit, with all the members dwell-
ing in sacrosanct confidence and harmony was never, apparently,
extended beyond the husband and wife. A son might testify
against his father, and a brother might cast grave doubts on his
sister's paternity .... Children might quarrel; they might attack
their parents on the stand; their parents might appear for or
against them in the most bitterly contested litigation; [yet the law
presumed that] the domestic peace remained undisturbed.
Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
17. Though this may not technically be a "privilege", the term is used
as a more effective means of explanation. See MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS
or PROOF 102 (1956); cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev.
1961): "[A] privilege [is] an exception to the general liability of every
person to give testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice.
." Id. at 527.
18. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. Actually this is a misnomer since the "privilege" belongs to the
Government. See 71 DIcK. L. REv. 366, 368 (1967).
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itself."20 In this third category are certain confidential communi-
cations 21 between attorney and client, 22 husband and wife,23 physi-
cian and patient, 24 priest and penitent,25 and a number of varia-
tions of these particular privileges.26 The ultimate effect of the
general practice by which a parent is compelled to testify against
his child falls within the design of the first type of privilege. The
method of proscribing such a practice, however, necessitates an
analysis of the third type of privilege. This type of privilege is a
prophylactic device 27 required to assure full effectuation of a so-
cially-desirable relationship.
20. Smith, Reintegrating Our Concepts of Privileged Communicants,
16 Soc. SER. REV. 191, 193 (1942) (emphasis added).
21. See Guttmacher and Weihofen, Privileged Communications Be-
tween Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32 (1952): "Perhaps all of the
privileged relationships that the law protects are those in which the com-
municant becomes in a sense an extension of the personality of the com-
municator." Id. at 35. See also MORGAN, INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE 31
(1950); "A confidential communication means information voluntarily
transmitted in confidence by one to the other" (emphasis in original).
22. See Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 62, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577); cf.
Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Profession-
als: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE
L.J. 1226 (1962): "Historically, the privilege belonged to the attorney as
a gentleman; and courts recognized the right of a gentleman not to violate
a pledge of secrecy. This right extended to all gentlemen ... " Id. at
1228.
23. See Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340, 155 S.W. 135 (1912): "No
public policy is sound which ... by means of the evidence of one, consigns
the other to the gallows, the penitentiary, or the jail." Id. at 355, 155
S.W. at 139. See also Sutton, Admissibility in Tennessee of Spouses'
Testimony Concerning Their Private Affairs, 3 VAND. L. REv. 298 (1950):
[W]hen one spouse was a party the other could not be a witness
against him. The incompetence of the witness was required by a
public policy embracing three separate considerations: (1) Mari-
tal discord would attend the appearance of one spouse against the
other. Parties were adversaries; so were witnesses to some ex-
tent. To preserve the 'peace of families,' the witness would not be
heard. (2) Marital confidence would be violated by the disclosure
of private affairs of husband and wife. As a result secretive
behavior would replace the frankness desirable between them.
(3) Incrimination of one spouse by the other would be repugnant
as akin to self-incrimination.
Id. at 298-99.
24. See Slovenko, note 16 supra: "Along with the ethical duty, there
is a legal duty upon the physician both to maintain secrecy and not to re-
veal confidences." Id. at 175.
25. Although Wigmore considers this privilege to be nonexistent at
common law, he states: "In criminal cases it would be impolitic to en-
courage a resort to this too facile channel of confessions." 8 J. WIGMORE,
EviDENcE §§ 2394, 2396 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
26. See generally Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the
Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Fisher].
27. Cf. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Priv-
Before determining the applicability of this prophylactic ra-
tionale to the child-parent relationship, it is necessary to briefly
examine the development of, and necessity for,28 the different
existing relational privileges. Each privilege must be considered in
the perspective of the "prime argument leveled against any testi-
monial privilege . . . that it hampers the due administration of
justice. The public is injured when litigation is stymied and the
enforcement of the law is impeded.
'2 9
B. Lawyer-Client
The first testimonial privilege to be examined is the lawyer-
client privilege. This privilege is authorized in all jurisdictions of
the United States either as a matter of statutory or common law.81
The justification most frequently given for the lawyer-client privi-
lege is that it protects the indisputable "need, for proper fulfill-
ment of the relationship, of frank and complete disclosure by the
client to his attorney, and the necessity of confidentiality to induce
ileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Louisell I] for a somewhat different viewpoint on the justification of
this particular kind of privilege:
[T]o conceive of the privileges merely as exclusionary rules, is to
start out on the wrong road and, except by happy accident, to
reach the wrong destination. They are, or rather by chance of liti-
gation may become, exclusionary rules; but this is incidental and
secondary. Primarily they are a right to be let alone, a right to un-
fettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships,
from the state's coercive or supervisory powers....
Id. at 110-11.
28. There occasionally appears an argument that certain relation-
ships, usually the marital, are intrinsically so confidential that it would be
sheer sacrilege to violate them. This "natural repugnance" argument sup-
posedly derives from the Roman Law discussed in note 16 supra. See
Ames v. Ames, 23 Mich. 347, 348, 204 N.W. 117, 118 (1925) (dissenting
opinion); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dis-
senting opinion) (compelling a clergyman to disclose conversation would
be "shocking to the moral sense of the community").
29. Note, The Journalist and his Confidential Source: Should a Tes-
timonial Privilege be Allowed?, 35 NEB. L. REv. 562, 575 (1956). It
should be noted that "hamper" as it is used in the quotation, was consid-
ered to be "a word of degree, which could include anything from a mere in-
convenience to an absolute bar to a particular proceeding." Id.
30. "A testimonial privilege is a fly in the soup of the law of evi-
dence. It is an exception to the general duty of every citizen to testify."
Id. at 562. Contra, Louisell I, supra note 27:
It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently
is of European law and is generally in Western society, that
whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by
recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay
for secrecy in certain communicative relations....
Id. at 110.
31. See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other
Professionals: Its Implication for the Privileged Communications Doctrine,
71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227 (1962). This is generally considered to be the only
professional privilege recognized at common law, although some authori-
ties also include the priest-penitent privilege. Id. at 1227 n.2. See also
C. McCoRMIcx, EvmsxcN. § 81 (1954).
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such disclosure. '32 Perhaps the most concise yet complete rationale
for the privilege is the statement that:
Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-
may be pursued too keenly-may cost too much. And,
surely the meanness and the mischief of prying into a
man's confidential consultations with his legal adviser,
the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, un-
easiness, and suspicion and fear, into those communications
which must take place, and which, unless in a condition of
perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too
great a price to pay for the truth itself.
83
In addition to the client's power to control the lawyer's dis-
closure of communications, 4 it is the general rule38 that the privi-
lege extends as well to communications to, or through, a person
acting as the confidential agent of the client.36 Furthermore, it
32. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II, 41
MINN. L. REV. 731, 743 n.46 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Louisell II]. The
author further states:
It seems . . . that the raison d'etre of the . .. privilege prop-
erly indicates emphasis not so much on the privileges conduce-
ment to full disclosure to the attorney as on a person's right of
privacy in certain vital human relations, and the correlative obli-
gation of the attorney to respect the right under sanction of a
'sense of treachery' for disclosing confidences.
Id. at 743 n.46; see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2219 (McNaughton rev.
1961); Donnelly, The Law of Evidence; Privacy and Disclosure, 14 LA. L.
REv. 361 (1954).
33. Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & Sm. 28-9, 16 L.J. Ch. 153 (1846).
34. See Note, supra note 5, concerning a definition of the term "com-
munications". The author, after an analysis of a number of decisions,
states that they may be placed in one of five categories:
... (1) Verbal exchanges whether oral or written (2) acts per-
formed with manifest intent to convey information (3) acts per-
formed with intent to convey information, the intent being implied
from the [nature] of the . . . relation (4) acts performed with
knowledge that they might convey information, but apparently
lacking in intent to so convey, and (5) any act or effect observed
by the [communicant] accidently, but consequent upon the ...
relation.
Id. at 220.
35. In the case of all of the "professional privileges", the right to
claim the privilege is in the client or lay person; the correlative obliga-
tion of secrecy is on the professional person. See C. McCoRMcK, En-
DENCE § 73 (1954); 8 J. WIGMORE, EviENce- § 2196 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
36. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942);
In re Busse's Estate, 332 Ill. App. 258, 75 N.E.2d 36 (1948); 15 U. Cm. L.
REv. 989 (1949):
Recognition of the privilege on the ground that the client's dis-
closure made in the presence of the agent and the attorney was
'secret' or 'confidential' is merely a way of stating the result....
The agent is present in order to promote or protect the interests
of the client rather than his own. The client may . . .have more
reason to expect non-disclosure by his agent.
Id. at 992.
has been held that communications made in attempting to retain
an attorney are privileged even though the proffered retainer is
refused; 87 and that eavesdropping on attorney-client conversations
pursuant to a subsequent criminal proceeding constitutes a viola-
tion of "due process" under the fifth amendment and the "right to
counsel" under the sixth amendment.38 One state supreme court
has held that where a non-agent attorney was present at the time
of an otherwise confidential communication between a lawyer
and his client, the client's privilege remained effective even though
the second attorney was not retained by the client.3 9 Apparently,
the court rationalized that since the client's conversation would
have been privileged as a confidential communication when made
alone to either of the attorneys,40 there was no reason to destroy the
privilege solely because its effect was doubled. Thus, it has oc-
casionally been held that in cases of "doubled privilege," as in
cases of single privilege, the only reasonable test for determining
the validity of a claim of lawyer-client privilege is whether the
communication is of a confidential nature.41 On the other hand,
when parties consult a lawyer for their mutual benefit, their
communications made at such consultation are not privileged as
between themselves. The primary reason for denying the privilege
in such a situation is that the communications are not intended to
be "secret."42 However, each party may still assert a privilege
against strangers to the otherwise privileged conference. 43
The value inherent in allowing a claim of attorney-client privi-
lege, as with all testimonial privileges, must be weighed against
the basic requirements necessary for the effective administration
of justice. Both the sanctions of maintaining confidentiality and
the production of facts in a legal system must be recognized as
socially desirable.44  The practical necessity of having a system
composed of laws and regulations and the importance of striving
for the most proper decisions are basic tenets of our system of
justice. A rule of privilege, however, is quite capable of ob-
structing that quest for justice by effectively limiting the range
of relevant facts which opposing attorneys, the commonly-chosen
seekers of facts in our adversary system, can bring before the
37. See Keir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11 So. 2d 886 (1943).
38. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); cf. Ellis v. State,
149 Tex. Crim. 1, 97 S.W.2d 351 (1946).
39. See Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492, 153 N.E. 740 (1926).
40. Assuming that the communicator-client intended the conversa-
tion to be part of the solicitation of legal advice.
41. See 34 MIcH. L. REv. 875, 877 (1936).
42. See generally Note, Privileged Communications-Some Recent
Developments, 5 VAN. L. REV. 590 (1952).
43. See, e.g., Luthy v. Seaburn, 242 Iowa 184, 46 N.W.2d 44 (1951);
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 151 Neb. 113, 36 N.W.2d 637 (1949).
44. See Rosenheim, Privilege, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Offend-
ers, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 660, 663 (1965).
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decision-making tribunal.45 A wholesale disclosure of confidential
communications would obviously destroy the purpose of retaining
counsel.46 It logically follows, therefore, that a client's right to
claim the lawyer-client privilege is a corollary to his right to engage
and be aided by legal representation. 47 If he has a right to obtain
such representation,48 then it is inescapable that he also has a




The next testimonial privilege 0 to be examined is the patient-
physician privilege. This privilege is based upon both a legal
and an ethical "duty" not to reveal confidences. The patient-
physician privilege did not exist at common law.5' Wigmore at-
tributes its existence to "the weight of professional medical opinion
pressing upon the Legislature." 2  Notwithstanding his cynicism,
the medical privilege is generally recognized in this country.5 3
Statutory recognition of this privilege is based upon a legislative
policy determination that without confidentiality a person would
hesitate to see a physician, let alone make revelations to him.54
Thus, the existence of the privilege in court as well as out of court
is considered not only a condition precedent to the realization of
45. Id.
46. The ultimate effect of condoning such a practice is to allow
what cannot be done directly. See Caldwell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 486,
287 S.W.2d 176 (1956).
47. See Louisell I, supra note 32, at 745; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. See material cited note 47 supra.
49. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
Compare Wigmore's explanation of the client-lawyer privilege as based on
the common obligation of gentlemen not to betray a confidence reposed in
them, 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-91 (McNaughton rev. 1961), with
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): "[O]ur accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an indi-
vidual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors."
Id. at 459.
50. This Article will only briefly discuss the limited extension of the
lawyer-client privilege rationale to the accountant-client, business associ-
ates, marriage counselor, psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker-
client privileges. For a general discussion of these "privileges" see Com-
ment, Functional Overlap Between the LawYer and Other Professionals:
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J.
1226 (1962).
51. See C. McCoamricx, EVIDENCE § 101 (1954); 8 J. WiMoRE, Evi-
DENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
52. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380(a) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
53. See Slovenko, supra note 16 at 184.
54. Id. at 187.
successful treatment but also as an inducement for a person to
visit a physician. It is just as important to maintain confidentiality
as to the fact of treatment as it is to communications made during
such treatment.55 Aside from the relatively minor amount of use-
ful information which the physician might be able to glean by ob-
servation alone, necessary information as to the patient's problem
must be elicited by a personal discussion. However, a great deal
of the information divulged by the patient may be highly damag-
ing, though relevant, evidence in subsequent litigation, particularly
in marital actions. 6
As a general rule, a person may not testify in regard to the
substance of statements made to him by another person in a case
where such testimony is used to prove the truth of those state-
ments.57 However, "there are many exceptions to the hearsay
rule, including admissions by parties, witness' declarations against
interest, and declarants' statements offered to show state of
mind." s Thus, the substance of patient-physician communications
could be revealed were it not for the privilege.59 In opposition to
the psychological, physical and moral importance of such con-
fidentiality to the patient, 0 critics of the patient-physician privi-
lege tend to overemphasize the supposed value to the adjudicative
processes of forcing the physician to disgorge in court secrets con-
fided in him. What such critics fail to recognize is that often the
"secret" pertains to an objective fact, the ascertainment of which,
if crucial to a just decision, is generally available to a competent
counsel from sources extrinsic to the secret itself.8 1 This is es-
55. Id. at 188. But see Doll v. Seandrett, 201 Minn. 316, 276 N.W. 281
(1937) (the court held that the patient-physician privilege was "waived"
as to both doctors who had conducted a unitary examination of the patient
when the patient-plaintiff called one of the doctors as a witness).
56. The fact that a physician treated a husband for venereal disease
would go a long way in proving infidelity on his part.
57. See Note, A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Communications
with Marriage Counselors, 106 U. PA. L. Ray. 266, 267 (1957).
58. Id. But see Fisher, supra note 26:
Privilege, as a rule of evidence, is unlike other rules. Hearsay
evidence, for example, is included in jury trial because of the in-
ability of jurors to give it proper weight . . . however, in trials
without a jury, the rules pertaining to all evidence, including
hearsay, are relatively relaxed.
Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
59. See Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client, and Spouse in New York,
21 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 288 (1949):
Although most rules of evidence are framed to exclude evidence
which is too far afield or apt to be inherently unreliable [this
privilege] deliberately excludes evidence generally considered
highly reliable, i.e. declarations against interest.
Id. at 289.
60. See Louisell II, supra note 32, at 750.
61. In line with these "extrinsic sources," it should be kept in mind
that nurses and other attendants to the physician are not included within
the patient-physician privilege in many States, "[w]ith the exception of
instances where such persons are acting in conjunction with parties en-
titled to invoke a privilege on privileged occasions." Slovenko, supra
note 16, at 181 n.24 .
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pecially so in light of the recent expansion of pre-trial discovery
procedures. 2 It is submitted that a rejection of the patient-physi-
cian privilege would be
the function of a philosophy which deems state processes
per se valuable and significant and individual interests
per se subordinate, a philosophy whose devastating effects
on human freedom often have been demonstrated by
history ancient and recent, and are being demonstrated
today.63
D. Priest-Penitent
The priest-penitent privilege, though somewhat disputed,
64
probably existed at common law6" and has been sanctioned by the
legislatures of most of the states.66 The primary justification for
the privilege is a "fear that the relationship would not be 'whole-
some' or effective if there were any fear [on the part of the
penitent] of disclosure of confidence."67 Wigmore, generally criti-
cal of all privileges, concedes that to destroy the priest-penitent
privilege would result in only slight benefit to justice while seri-
ously weakening many religions.68 It cannot be reasonably as-
sumed that if the privilege were removed, persons of the Roman
Catholic religion would stop going to confession.69 A more reason-
able justification for the privilege is that compelling priests to di-
62. See Louisell II, supra note 32, at 750.
63. Id., cf. Regan & Macartney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged
Communications, 2 CATHOLIC LAW. 3 (1956), where the authors state that
the "duty" to refrain from divulging confidences: "[A]rises from legal
justice insofar as it is necessary for the common welfare [bonum commune]
that persons who are in distress of ... body be not unduly restrained
from seeking the assistance of qualified persons." Id. at 4.
64. See generally In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931);
BEST, EVIDENCE § 584 (12th ed. 1922); Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary
Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413 (1966).
65. See Regan & Macartney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged
Communications, 2 CATHOLIC LAW. 3 (1956): "[P]ersons who are in dis-
tress of soul or mind [should] not be unduly restrained from seeking ...
assistance." Id. at 4 n.2.
66. Cf. 46 YALE L.J. 703 (1937).
67. Fisher, supra note 26, at 621.
68. 8 J. WiCMOm, EVIDENCE § 2396 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But see
Lo Gatto, Privileged Communications and the Social Worker, 8 CATHO-
LiC LAW. 5 (1962):
The writer as a priest of nearly twenty years' experience, and as a
member of the bar, easily and honestly attests to the fact that
outside of the realm of the confessional-which is a totally dif-
ferent category of itself and sui generis-the priest or lawyer is
not in a more confidential relationship with clients, or parishion-
ers than the social worker.
Id. at 17.
69. See Fisher, supra note 26, at 621.
vulge the substance of communications goes "against the grain."7 0
Such a practice is naturally repugnant7" and is, therefore, pro-
scribed.
E. Husband-Wife
The final privilege to be examined is the marital privilege.
This privilege was formulated under the common law72 as a result
of two then-current beliefs: first, that interested parties were
not credible witnesses in their own causes,7 3 and second, the
general acceptance of Coke's metaphysical conception of the hus-
band and wife as being one legal entity.74 The rationale of the
privilege, however, evolved into a policy of protecting the har-
mony of the marital relationship, 75 as well as avoiding the "na-
tural repugnancy" inherent in compelling one spouse to testify
against the other. 76 The privilege, called by some the most impor-
tant,77 has been stated to be "deeply rooted in our political and
social fabric, as [it is] in the mores and ethos of at least Western
society. 78 The common law considered only the presence of a
marital relationship, rather than the existence of any pecuniary or
proprietary interest of the spouses, in applying the privilege.
7 9
The privilege has since been applied in other than ordinary judicial
tribunals. 80
70. Id. at 624. This is assuming that a priest would testify under
the threat of contempt, which, it must be added, is a rather doubtful
assumption.
71. See note 121 infra.
72. See Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897) (recognizing the
marital privilege to have derived from the common law); cf. C. McCor-
MICK, EVIDENCE §§ 169-70 (1954).
73. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 443 (1765): "If they
were admitted to be witnesses for each other, they would contradict one
maxim of law, Nemo in propria causa testis esse debet ... " (No one
ought to be a witness in his own cause).
74. See L. CoKE, COMMENTARY UPON LImTnoN, 6B (Chargrave 16th
ed. 1809). See also Note, supra note 5, at 208.
75. Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1736): "The reason why
the law will not suffer a wife to be a witness for or against her husband is
to preserve the peace of families." Id.; accord, Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa.
281 (1868).
76. See Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 (1867); Bent v. Allot, Cary
135, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1579); cf. Guttmacher & Weihoffen, Privileged Com-
munications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32 (1952),
where the authors seemingly ratify Coke's theory that husband and wife are
one legal entity: "Husband and wife, we say, are one; when the husband
discusses a subject with his wife, he is talking to his other, or as we
say, his better half." Id. at 35.
77. Fisher, supra note 26, at 625.
78. Louisell I, supra note 27, at 108.
79. See Seaton v. Kendall, 171 Ill. 410, 49 N.E. 561 (1898).
80. See Brosman, Edward Livingston and Spousal Testimony in
Louisiana, 11 TULANE L. REv. 243, 248 (1937). See also, Note, supra
note 5:
The privilege can be invoked in both civil and criminal
cases. It has been allowed in administrative hearings, grand jury
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The marital privilege, however, is subject to a variety of limi-
tations. The privilege is only available to partners of a valid
marriage, although in some cases it has been held applicable when
a marriage occurred after the commencement of the particular
action in which the privilege was invoked."' Furthermore, it is
the general rule that in the absence of some express statutory pro-
hibition, a spouse's testimony concerning "acts of cruelty" com-
mitted by the other spouse is not privileged and, hence admissible.
Such testimony is admitted on the grounds that either no confiden-
tial communication was involved or that the information consti-
tuting the spouse's testimony was not gained as a result of the
marital relationship.82 The marital privilege is generally accepted
to transcend both the death of a spouse and divorce,83 so long as the
testimony sought to be elicited concerns intraspousal, confidential
communications made during marriage.8 4 The doctrine of waiver
is applicable in regard to the marital privilege.8 5 It is frequently
proceedings, military trials, and probably where one spouse gives
an affidavit in support of a search warrant.
Id. at 229.
81. See Note, supra note 5, at 211.
82. See O'Laughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932) (allow-
ing the testimony of a wife against a husband charged with the murder of
the spouses' child); cf. O'Donley v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. 352, 219 P.2d 259
(1950). Contra, Toth v. State, 141 Neb. 448, 3 N.W.2d 899 (1942) (an inter-
esting case dealing with the privilege involving a prosecution of a hus-
band for incest with his daughter, in which his wife was allowed to
testify against him. On appeal, the husband contended that the testimony
was "incompetent" because of a statute prohibiting one spouse from tes-
tifying against the other "except in a criminal proceeding for a crime
committed by the one against the other." In reversing the conviction the
court declared that the wife's testimony was inadmissible because the in-
cest was not "a crime against" the wife). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.
2d 1389, 1411 (1950); 27 MINN. L. Rsv. 205 (1943):
In cases involving corporal violence by one spouse against the
other, the courts have admitted the injured spouse's testimony in a
prosecution for assault and battery .... [citation omitted].
Id.
83. But see Note, supra note 5:
Even in the very early days of the privilege, it was allowed in spite
of a known lack of harmony between the parties. In R. v. Cliv-
inger, Term R. 269, 100 Eng. Rep. 143 (K.B. 1788), the privilege
being allowed even though the husband had deserted his home and
married another woman.
Id. at 214 n.2.
84. Id. at 217.
85. See 8 J. Wimos, EVIDENCE § 2340 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
See generally Sutton, Admissibility in Tennessee of Spouse's Testimony
Concerning Their Private Affairs, 3 VAND. L. REV. 298 (1950):
The marital communications statutes are of two general types:
one makes the testimony inadmissible; the other creates a privi-
lege against its admission. The important difference is that
the privilege may be waived and the testimony thereby made
held, however, that when a spouse maliciously conveys certain
information to a third person, the "natural repugnance" theory
necessitates a prohibition against the third person from testifying
as to the contents of that information.86 It is also generally agreed
that the use of intermediaries as a means of communication negates
the validity of the privilege.87 Thus, despite the prevailing pre-
sumption that any "confidential" ' discourse between spouses is
privileged, it is also true that often the judiciary has found this
presumption rebuttable.8 9  Notwithstanding the trend toward
limiting the scope of all privileges,90 it appears that the most basic
policy justification for the husband-wife privilege is that:
A marriage without the right of complete privacy of com-
munication would necessarily be an imperfect union.
Utter freedom of marital communication from all govern-
ment supervision, constraint, control or observation, save
only when the communications are for an illegal purpose,
is a psychological necessity for the perfect fulfillment of
marriage. Recognition by the state that spouses possess
such right of confidential communication by reason of the
nature of their relationship, promotes the public policy of
furthering and safeguarding the objectives of marriage
just as other institutions in the area of domestic relations
or family law promote it.91
admissible.
Id. at 299. A series of cases have held that communications between
spouses made voluntarily in the presence of their children, if old enough
to comprehend the communications, or other members of the immediate
family are not privileged. See, e.g., Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51,
143 N.E. 813 (1924); Cowser v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 265, 157 S.W. 758
(1913); Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W. Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925). Contra,
Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 130 N.E. 220 (1921).
86. See Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951) (the
appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling that a tape recording of a
marital conversation could be introduced when it was procured by collu-
sion of the father and his son); Note, supra note 5, at 210.
87. See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1943) (Supreme Court
held that a husband's private secretary could testify as to the contents of a
letter she had transcribed from the dictation of her employer, the hus-
band, which letter was intended for his wife. The court reasoned that
spouses can generally communicate without the use of such third persons
and, thus, this was a voluntary disclosure). But see 34 MicH. L. REv. 875,
877 n.11 (1936).
88. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
89. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 385 U.S. 74 (1958). (Supreme
Court indicated that the underlying justification of the marital privi-
lege is suspect); State v. Robbins, 35 Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950).
90. See generally Note, A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Com-
munications with Marriage Counsellors, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 267 (1957).
91. Louisell I, supra note 27, at 113 (emphasis added). See also
Note, supra note 5:
It can hardly be disputed that confidence and unimpaired com-
munication is of the essence of marriage, which in turn is a vital
foundation of our society. To subject these communications to
disclosure in court would restrict and inhibit freedom of commu-
nication between the spouses, thus destroying the vehicle which
fosters harmonious and productive marriages. Further, persons of





With the examination of the existing four privileges92 as a
suitable frame of reference, both the utility and the practicality of
creating" a child-parent privilege will be illustrated. The stimulus
for a child-parent privilege is evident in Judge Edgerton's opinion
in Mullen v. United States.94 This opinion discusses the conditions
necessary for the creation of any legitimate privilege:
I think a communication made in reasonable confidence
that it will not be disclosed, and in such circumstances
that disclosure is shocking to the moral sense of the com-
munity, should not be disclosed in a judicial proceeding,
whether the trusted person is or is not a wife, husband,
doctor, lawyer, or minister.9 5
Judge Edgerton's functional approach to the justification for
any privilege will, for the purposes of this analysis, focus on
the one function that permeates the existing privileges. This
function is the maintenance of a socially desirable relationship.
The feasibility of creating a child-parent privilege will be tested
by the use of Wigmore's four postulates for determining whether a
privilege should be adopted.9 6 The employment of Wigmore's test
is necessary since it has been accepted by both legal scholars,
97
in determining whether a state legislature should grant a privilege
to a newly recognized desirable relationship, 98 and by judges,9
in determining whether a claim of privilege should be sustained
serving one spouse compelled to reveal communications made in
the intimacy of marriage.
Id. at 231.
92. See Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client, and Spouse in New York,
21 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL, 288 (1949): "[T]hey [the four privileges] are ...
generally deprecated and their extension opposed by the commentators and
the courts." Id. at 289.
93. See note 5 supra.
94. 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
95. Id. at 281 (emphasis added). It is submitted that this same stimu-
lus would justify the existing privileges and, in addition, support a prop-
erly defined privilege in other types of relationships.
96. See note 142 and accompanying text infra.
97. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 26 (psychotherapeutic profession);
Note, A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Communication with Mar-
riage Counsellors, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1957).
98. See Note, The Social-Worker Client Relationship and Privileged
Communications, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 362, 366 (1965).
99. Id.; see, e.g., Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 P. 531 (1919);
State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947); State ex rel. Haugh-
land v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946); In re Kryschuk &
Zulynik, 14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958).
in a particular fact situation.10 0 The remainder of this Article will
discuss the Edgerton stimulus, the Wigmore test, and the Supreme
Court's prospectus in Gault o1 ' in relation to creating a child-parent
privilege.
B. Basis for the Privilege
The purpose of the juvenile court system in the United States
is to treat and rehabilitate the adolescent.1 0 2 Many critics of the
juvenile court system, however, observe that "[T]he powers of
the Star Chamber were trifle in comparison with those of our
juvenile courts. o103 One survey states that "[A]n estimated 99
percent of the children [brought to the juvenile courts] for de-
linquency admit involvement in the offense named, often tear-
fully, sometimes cheerfully."1 04 Therefore, it is reasonable to as-
sume that Gault, by granting the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to juveniles, 0 5 will precipitate a substantial increase in the
number of attempts to compel a parent 06 to indirectly provide
the same admission of involvement that Gault prohibits the ju-
venile court'07 from obtaining directly from the juvenile. 0 8
100. See Note, The Social-Workeer Client Relationship and Privileged
Communications, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 362, 366 (1965).
101. Two factors must be emphasized as a result of the Court's opin-
ion in Gault. First, the Supreme Court declared that:
The greatest care must be taken to assure that the [juvenile's
inculpatory statement] was voluntary, in the sense not only that
it [was] not the product of ignorance of rights or adolescent
fantasy, fright, or despair.
Id. at 55. Second, its reliance (unmistakable, although Gault did not
directly quote Miranda), on Miranda's holding that the privilege against
self-incrimination "is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard [i.e. a conviction based on evidence not voluntarily submitted by
the accused]." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966). The ultimate
goal of Miranda was "to make the individual more acutely aware that he
is... not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interests." Id. at469.
102. See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 19 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Handler].
103. Pound, Foreward to YOUNG, SOCIAL TsREmENT IN PROBATION AND
DELINQUENCY at XXVII (1937).
104. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JusTicE
FOR THE CHILD 87 (Rosenheim ed. 1962). The author continued that
"[I]n one court a count of three thousand consecutive cases over a two-
year period revealed only five children who had wholly denied involve-
ment in the named offense." Id.
105. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37 (1967). In regard to previous bestowals
of the privilege against self-incrimination to juveniles see Hampton v.
State, 167 Ala. 73, 52 So. 659 (1910); In re Gregory W. & Gerald S., 19
N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966).
106. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court, almost half a
century before Gault, recognized that adults who are before the juvenile
courts must be accorded their constitutional rights. See United States v.
Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
107. Before the passage of the Juvenile Court Acts, it was accepted
that minors accused of crime were entitled to the same constitutional
rights afforded to adults. See, e.g., People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner,
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The opposition to recognizing the privilege against self-in-
crimination has historically been based on a determination that
confession and self-examination by the juvenile embody impor-
tant therapeutic values: "The youth should be encouraged to speak
openly both about himself and the offense [since] in order to
rehabilitate [him], he must first admit his crime and so be aware
that he is in need of rehabilitation.' 10 9 It reasonably follows
that the basis for creating an acceptable child-parent privilege
must include the concept of fostering a therapeutic relationship 10
as the desired goal of the privilege."'
55 IIl. 280 (1870) ("due process of law"); Commonwealth v. Horregan,
127 Mass. 450 (1879) ("right to presentment by a grand jury"); State ex rel.
Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885) ("due process of law", "right to
trial by jury"). See generally Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile
Courts, 46 CORNErL L. REV. 387 (1961).
108. But see Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Rights]:
The judges generally agreed that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation should not apply in the juvenile courts. Usually, this oppo-
sition was couched in terms of the child's well-being and the re-
habilitative orientation of the system.
Id. at 331.
109. Id. at 331 n.265 (emphasis added); Alexander, Constitutional
Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 1206 (1960):
To help the child change his attitude, a clean breast, a confession,
is a primary prerequisite, a sine qua non. Otherwise the court
would be aiding the child to build his future on a foundation of
falsehood and deceit, to build his house on sand instead of the rock
of truth and honesty.
Id. at 1208.
110. See Rosenheim, Privilege, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Offenders,
11 WAYNE L. REV. 660 (1965):
In theory a social work privilege appears desirable for precisely the
same reasons which justify [a privilege's] extension to the clients
or patients of psychologists and psychiatrists. It is the special
character of the therapeutic process that is crucial.
Id. at 669 (emphasis added); Note, A Suggested Privilege for Confiden-
tial Communications with Marriage Counsellors, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 266
(1967):
The therapeutic value to the client, in fact, springs to a great ex-
tent from [the client's] opportunity to talk over his problem with
a sympathetic listener. At the same time, he is given the benefit
of sharing in the counsellor's broad understanding of the problems
and possible solutions of marital difficulties.
Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
111. Compare MUDD, THE PRAcTIcE OF MARRIAGE COUNSELINc 40-41
(1951):
[By providing] the opportunity [for] using the counsellor as an
objective sounding board . . . in the majority of instances . . .
the person seeking help . . . is able to change his attitudes and
develop new and unused parts of himself. (emphasis added).
with Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction, 9 CRIME & DELIN. 121
(1963), where the authors declared that to change the "distorted atti-
tudes" of juvenile delinquents:
Initially, it should be recognized that the home and the fam-
ily 1 2 constitute the first social organizaton into which a child is
brought. 113 The sanctity, serenity, freedom and organization of
that unit will have a marked effect upon the personality and de-
velopment of the child and upon his ability to become an effective
and operative part of the community. 11 4 A child first learns who
he is through his relationship with his family. His mental and
moral growth thereafter depend upon the stability of personal re-
lationships, 1 5 which only the family"' presently appear able to
provide. The failure and decay of the family"l T has a correspond-
ing effect on our society as a whole."18 It is submitted that corn-
The correctional agent must present to these children a reliable
and convincing image of unshakeable honesty and forthright-
ness. Without this basic requirement, all the therapeutic skill
and ingenuity in the world will not make a dent in their problems.
Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
112. It is generally conceded that the family is the "cradle of
civilization." See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 S.E. 12, 15
(1923).
113. See Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (Cir. Ct.
1925).
114. See Furlough, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to
Family Stability, 19 HAST. L.J. 105 (1967):
Studies of the growth and development of children and of the
functioning of adults in society show a close relationship between
the individual's functioning in society and the quality of the rela-
tionships within the family. Statistical studies of delinquency,
crime, suicide, and mental illness show that these indices of per-
sonal failure that create problems for society are closely associated
with the damaging relationships in failing families.
Id. at 115. But see Rights, supra note 108, where the author states that a
child's failure to cope with his home environment
very often helps the [child] to perceive the social influences in his
family, neighborhood, or peer group which cause him to behave as
he does, and then to come to some sort of comprehension of the
inutility of leading such a disjunctive life.
Id. at 303.
115. See Bridgman, The Lawyer and the Marriage Counselor Pari
Pass v. Partners in More Effective Service to Ailing Marriages, 4 KAN. L.
REV. 546 (1956): "[Statistics] tell us that inability of parents to adjust
to each other in marriage is related to unhappiness, twisted values, and
maladjustment in [their] children." Id. at 548.
116. See Ungar, Privilege and the Marriage Counsellor, 5 BROOKLYN
B. 49 (1953); Gardner, What Reforms are Needed in the Texas Juvenile
Court Statute, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 870 (1960):
It was pointed out by one expert that there is a rising recognition
in America that vast numbers of the nation's families are in trou-
ble-sick from internal frustrations and external pressures in a
society which expects the individual family to act as a buffer be-tween a poorly integrated social order and the county's children.
Id. at 871. See also Hill, The American Family Today, 1 THE NATION'S
CHrLDRE_ 76 (1960 White House Conference).
117. For a general discussion see, Witmer & Herzog, And What
About the Parents of Juvenile Delinquents, 19 FED. PROs. 17 (Mar. 1955).
118. Furlong, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Family
Stability, 19 HAST. L.J. 105 (1967); Rights, supra note 108: "Once a boy
has entered the delinquency facility and become exposed to prison-like
surroundings and criminally-oriented inmates, the contamination which
began in the home may never be reversed." Id. at 303.
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pelling"1 9 a parent to testify against his child is to destroy the
desired intrafamilial rapport which is crucial to sustaining the
child-parent relationship. 120 This method of circumventing a ju-
venile's privilege against self-incrimination is repugnant to our
system of justice and fair play.12' The question remains, however,
119. This does not include a situation where the parents themselves
are seeking to have their child committed. See generally Rights, supra
note 108, at 329. For a disturbing commentary on some of the abuses of
the above, see Grygier, The Concept of the "State of Delinquency" and its
Consequences for Treatment of Young Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 627
(1967):
In England, ... the child is either charged with a particular of-
fense, or else is adjudged to be "beyond control" or "in need of
care and protection." What in fact happens is that the charge
"beyond control" is not made against the parents, although re-
search in juvenile delinquency has amply demonstrated that it is
the parents who fail to exercise proper control and thus make one
of the major contributions to juvenile delinquency. Until very
recently the charge "beyond control" was made by the parents
against the child, and anyone acquainted with proceedings in Eng-
lish juvenile courts must have had the unforgettable experience of
hearing parents give evidence against their own children in order
to clear themselves of any blame.
Id. at 648 (emphasis added); cf. Glueck, Toward Improving the Identifica-
tion of Delinquents, 53 J. CRiM. L.C.&P.S. 164 (1962).
120. Considering the indisputable fact that "a court hearing is prob-
ably an enormous emotional disturbance to a child," Paulsen, Fairness to
the Juvenile Offender, 41 MnrN. L. REv. 547, 561 (1957), and that numer-
ous studies have proven "that a central problem for many delinquent
children is their mistrust of authority and their rejection of the behavioral
standards imposed on them by authority figures [caused] by unfair, in-
consistent or even dishonest parents earlier in the lives of these children,"
Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction, 9 CRIME & DELIN. 121, 127
(1963), it should be self-explanatory that such testimony by the parent
may destroy the required "sense of trust" needed if the child-parent rela-
tionship is to flourish. Thus, the following instance, reported in Witmer &
Herzog, And What About the Parents of Juvenile Delinquents, 19 FED.
PoB. 17 (Mar. 1955), can usually be predicted:
A psychiatrist told of a girl who could no longer trust her mother
and, as a result, could trust nobody. "When we find a youngster
who has no effective relationship with adults," he said, "we have
[a child] who will not keep within [society's] rules."
Id. at 18.
121. See Manley, Patient, Penitent, Client, and Spouse in New York,
21 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 288 (1949), where the author concluded that a privilege
is justified if it satisfies the following inveterate human instincts and
desires:
1. Instinctive revulsion against the betrayal of a confidence.
2. A sense of compassion even for a transgressor, i.e. a feeling
that there should be for every man some sanctuary beyond the
reach of society's law where he may safely confide his guilty
secrets in an attempt to ease his troubled spirit.
3. A sense of fair play related to the Norman view of a lawsuit
as a species of contest or sporting event wherein it would be
too easy, and hence unfair and against the 'rules of the game,'
to hound a man to his doom by convicting him through the
lips of his own intimate friends, family, or medical, legal, or
as to whether a child 122 should be given control 23 of the non-
familial uses124 to which his statements, made in confidence to his
parent, may be put.125 The basis of the privilege is to foster a
therapeutic relationship. It becomes necessary, therefore, to de-
cide if merely discussing some antisocial behavior with a parent is
therapeutic for the child.
A "therapeutic relationship" is one in which the communicator
possesses a "feeling that he may explore his problems without fear
that his confidences will be revealed to others later. In this sense,
the relationship of therapist to [communicator] resembles that of
priest to penitent."'12 6 Therapy results from a child-parent rela-
spiritual advisors.
4. A desire to preserve the function of certain socially valuable
relationships even at the cost of occasional suppression of truth
and injustice in such, presumably few, particular cases.
5. A feeling of individual and professional pride and self-im-
portance in being the inviolable repository of others' secrets.
Id. at 290. The child-parent privilege would more than adequately
satisfy these requirements.
122. Paradoxically, in some jurisdictions the youth is allowed to tes-
tify on his own behalf "only if his parent is present and accedes" to such
testimony. Rights, supra note 108, at 330 n.260. Since this "privilege"
belongs to the child and may not be claimed by the parent, the juvenile's
attorney will no doubt decide whether the privilege should be claimed.
Id. at 332. But there remains a serious practical problem (outside the scope
of this Article) concerning the general "anxiety over the possibility that
enforcement of the privilege would permit some youths to avoid de-
linquency adjudications." Id. at 331. Compare the language "it would be
doing a great disservice to the youth to let him off scot-free only because
his lawyer prevented [his parent] from testifying," Id. at 332, with the
words of Judge Paul A. Alexander of the Toledo Family Court Center:
"The law disserves rather than preserves and conserves [this] basic social
institution, the family." Quoted in Bridgman, The Lawyer and the Mar-
riage Counselor Pari Pass v. Partners in More Effective Service to Ailing
Marriages, 4 KAN. L. REV. 546, 549 (1956).
123. See Welch, Fundamental Fairness In a Quasi-Criminal Forum,
50 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1966):
The need for a jealously protected attorney-client privilege is as
strong in juvenile court as in any other instance. In juvenile court
it is especially important that the defendant have complete
confidence that his case has been fully presented and that the
state's case has been fully tested before any treatment or correc-
tion is undertaken.
Id. at 680.
124. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) where the Court
stated that the privilege against self-incrimination "is as broad as the mis-
chief against which it seems to guard." Id. at 562.
125. A peripheral question, which for the purposes of brevity and
avoidance of additional confusion will not be examined in this Article, is
whether the rationale supporting the Supreme Court's statement in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the "warning of the right
to remain silent [is required] to make the individual more acutely aware
... that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest,"
id. at 469, will eventually have some applicability to the child's statements
made to a hostile parent.
126. See Slovenko, supra note 16: "Existing statutes on [privileges]




tionship when the disturbed person (child) 127 is seeking help be-
cause he fears the social consequences (punishment) of his be-
havior.128 The successful resolution of the child's problem lies in
in his willingness "to reveal all.' 29 The treatment is frustrated, 13 0
however, when the child fears that the therapist (parent)' 3 ' may be
127. See Ketchum, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 585 (1965):
First impressions, we all know, are most important-often indeli-
ble. A boy in community trouble for the first time feels very
much alone. Whether justifiably or not, he sees school authori-
ties, police and court officials as demanding, judgmental and
often hostile. In some instances, even his parents appears to be
critical or antagonistic.
Id. at 595.
128. See Gehrig, The Children's Court, 21 BRooxLYN L. REv. 154
(1955):
The normal child in trouble responds to a friend and a friend
may often help the child to look hopefully to the future. When a
child is so treated, there is a greater chance of that child becoming
a good citizen rather than a cynical or vindictive adult.
Id. at 159.
129. But see Comment, Miranda Guarantees in the California Juvenile
Court, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 114 (1966), concerning the supposed probation
officer-child relationship in which the officer
tries to win the child's trust and respect; a confession, he urges, is
the only way to clear the child's conscience and will result in bet-
ter treatment. If a petition is filed in juvenile court, the child sees
the probation officer presenting information to the court like a
policeman. [Thus], the child concludes that he has been "conned."
"Trust" and "friendship" disappear; the child is now to be treated
by a man he doesn't trust, this attitude may be retained and affect
future behavior.
Id. at 129. Cf. MATZA, DELINQUENcY AND DRIFT 145-149 (1964).
130. See Slovenko, supra note 16:
Children, the physically handicapped, and the alcoholic are exam-
ples where "environmental manipulation" may be essential. With
some children, it is particularly desirable to involve the child's par-
ents in the treatment process. Therapeutic gains with the child
himself will often be short-lived unless the parents are also able
to change.
Id. at 191. However, the author also states:
With other children, however, the psychiatrist must insulate the
treatment-situation from everyday family . . . pressure. The de-
linquent youngster, for example, requires a psychiatrist who is sep-
arated from [the family]. To do otherwise may destroy the pos-
sibilities of a therapeutic relationship.
Id. at 191 n.52; cf. JUNe, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SouL 88 (1933):
"Psychiatrists ... must struggle with their patient's families and guardians
whose 'understanding' is proverbial."
131. See Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The Gap
Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175 (1962):
Such concerns may be even more prevalent among persons in
lower socio-economic groups, who are most difficult to reach in
psychiatric treatment. Such persons tend to be more than ordi-
narily suspicious of authority figures and of the prospect that their
disclosures will be used to their disadvantages.
Id. at 179 n.6 (quoting, HOLLINSHEAD & REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL
ILLNESS 301-302 (1958)). The authors later state:
forced to testify against him.182 Juvenile courts have historically'8 3
and consistently'3 4 held that this "confession""1 5 of complicity in
Yet one of the very things psychiatric treatment strives for is
eliciting [disclosures of intent, which may include an intent to
commit a crime] on the assumption that less harm will ensue if
it is ventilated than if it is suppressed.
Id. at 183.
132. Note, Privileged Communications-Some Recent Developments,
5 VAN. L. REv. 590, 598 (1952). But see Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957):
An authoritative source has said: "A fair hearing does not mean
that the child . . . needs to be present while all the evidence is
being presented. The court may exclude the child (but not his
counsel) from the hearing at any time that it thinks proper, and
should do so, especially when the evidence is considered not fit
for him to hear or when it may damage his confidence in his
parents."
Id. at 560 (emphasis added), cf. Whitlach, The Juvenile Court-A Court
of Law, 18 WEST. RES. L. REv. 1239 (1967) where the author commented
that some factions feared that to compel disclosure
would be completely destructive of the entire juvenile court proc-
ess. Those who opposed disclosure claimed that such procedure
would destroy the confidential relationship . . . would be disrup-
tive of family relationships, since one member of a family would
learn what another member had said concerning him or her; and
would completely dry up sources of information.
Id. at 1246 (emphasis added). See also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967), for a discussion of the social necessity for valuable "sources" in the
area of narcotics control.
133. See generally Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court,
12 How. L.J. 76 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Quick). But see Wolfram,
John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillar of Fire, 3 Syn. L. REv. 213 (1952), dis-
cussing a document entitled The Humble Petition of Many Thousands
which was presented to Parliament in 1647 requesting the inclusion in a
written constitution of the following phrase: ". . . that you permit no au-
thority whatsoever to compel any person or persons, to answer to any
questions against themselves or nearest relations ... " Id. at 220, n.25
(emphasis added).
134. See generally Welch, Fundamental Fairness in a Quasi-Criminal
Forum, 50 MNN. L. REV. 653, 687 (1966); Comment, Juvenile Justice in
Transition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1144 (1967).
135. See Long, Headquarters of a Judge-A Challenge to the Bar, 27
WASH. L. Rzv. 130 (1952):
Most kids, when confronted by the police, not only confess to the
matter at issue, but will voluntarily involve themselves and others
in offenses the officers had not even heard of .... [Niot having
the mature experience of us adults ... they usually "shoot the
works," and "sing."
Id. at 135 (emphasis added). Compare Comment, Juvenile Justice in
Transition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1144 (1967):
[T]here are strong indications that juveniles cooperate with author-
ities not because they place great confidence and trust in them,
but because they realize that cooperation is the key to lighter
sentences. What are over-optimistically construed as signs of
'rehabilitation' may actually be only efforts to manipulate juvenile
authorities.
Id. at 1148 (emphasis added), with Handler, supra note 102: "The most
logical [psychological] defense to this ... and the one most commonly
used, is manipulation: 'Play ball' to get on the good side of the police
officer, the probation officer, or even the judge." Id. at 19 (emphasis
added). See also Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court in
JUSTICE FOR THE CmILD 204 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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"wrongful" 1 6 conduct is the sine qua non'87 to rehabilitating the
juvenile. It would be incredulous to assume that, because Gault
prohibits forcing a child to confess, the child's confession to his
parent is not rehabilitative. It therefore seems reasonable to
conclude that the child-parent relationship is "therapeutic"''s 8 in-
sofar as it permits the child to confess his guilt to his parent; and
a socially desirable relationship, therefore, exists which society
has an interest in fostering. 8 9
136. Compare Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11
WAYNE L. REV. 367 (1964), where the author declares that "uncertain
criminal laws threaten the principle of generality . . . which is basic to
our concept of justice." Id. at 425, with Handler supra note 102:
[I]t is very doubtful whether the confession ... mean[s] that
[the] adolescent agree[s] with the allegations in the petition....
We already have evidence that many adult confessions are
badly bargained for by psychiatrically disturbed persons who
really do not understand what it is they are admitting or the
likely consequences.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967):
[T]he greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission
[of involvement] was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was
not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.
Id. at 55 (emphasis added). But see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 Va.
466, 35 S.E.2d 770 (1945) (a criminal case where the court decided that a
confession of a 14 year old boy, with an I.Q. of 79 and a mental age of 11,
was competent even though there was no counsel present); cf. Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.
2d 844 (Family Ct. 1963).
137. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A.J.
1206, 1208 (1960). But see Welch, Fundamental Fairness In a Quasi-
Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1966), criticizing Judge Alexander's
likening of the juvenile court's "quest for confessions" with "a doctor's
concern in treating a sick child." Id. at 687. Welch caustically noted:
The analogy may be a fair one, but it fails to prove what is in-
tended [by the examination]; no doctor would ever insist that a
child diagnose his own case upon peril of being deemed unsuitable
for treatment merely because he refuses to cooperate.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. See 16 PSYCmATRY 113 (1953): "Everyone who tries to encourage
a despondent friend or to reassure a panicky child practices psychotherapy."
139. But see Connor, The Qualification of Defendant's Spouse as a
Witness in Criminal Cases, 9 NOTRE DAME LAw. 272 (1934):
The courts seem to have been dominated by a desire to preserve
the marital state free from the dangers that might accrue if the
law would permit one spouse to give testimony against the other.
But if this represented the controlling desire and reason for the
[marital privilege], it is strange that the common law did not ex-
tend this safeguard to the other family relations so as to disqualify
all members of the party's family. Is not the security and peace of
the family just as much jeopardized by the damaging testimony of
the son or daughter of the defendant as by that of the spouse?
Yet the common law did not extend the disqualification to the
son qua son or the daughter qua daughter or the other family
relations. In this respect the common law did not receive its in-
C. Wigmore Test
The mere fact of the existence of such a relationship, however,
does not ipso facto demand a determination that a privilege must
be created to protect that relationship. 140 On the contrary, there
are a number of questions yet to be resolved. This particular re-
lationship must satisfy the "Wigmore Test" for determining whether
a privilege should be adopted.1 4 1 As stated by Wigmore, the test is
as follows:
142
1. The communication must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation be-
spiration from the civil or ecclesiastical law.
Id. at 274 (emphasis added); cf. MAKENSIE, STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW 331
(3d ed. 1870).
At least one legal writer has concluded that society's "interest" in this
relationship is paramount to its interest in the parties themselves. See
MacKensie, Spiritual Values and the Family Court, 18 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 20, 22 (1953). See also People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 43
Cal. Rptr. 28 (1965) (involving a severe beating inflicted upon a five month
old child where the parents were convicted of "child abuse"; the trial judge
suspended sentence and placed them on probation for three years).
140. Occasionally, some more enlightened judges have indirectly rec-
ognized the privilege. See Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio 542 (1876) (a case
in which the presence of a mother at a consultation between an attor-
ney and her young daughter, a prosecutrix in a seduction case, was held
not to be required to be disclosed). The court stated:
It is well established that the privilege extends as well to commu-
nications to or through an agent, as to those made directly by
the [communicator] in person, and we think it is only a dictate of
decency and propriety in regard to the mother... as being present
and acting in the character of the confidential agent of her
daughter. The daughter's youth and supposed modesty would
render the presence and participation of her mother appropriate
and necessary.
Id. at 546. Contra, McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TExAs L. REv. 447, 462 (1938), where the author refutes
the principal-agent theory of privileges. See also In re Tahbel, 46 Cal.
App. 755, 189 P. 804 (1920) (freeing on habeas corpus a young boy who had
been committed for refusing as a witness in a juvenile court to answer
questions concerning family matters); State v. March, 126 Wash. 142, 217
P. 705 (1923) (holding unconstitutional an attempt by a juvenile court
judge to hear in chambers evidence that an adult had contributed to
the "delinquency" of a minor).
141. See Slovenko, supra note 16, at 184, n.3, where he discusses Wig-
more's latent approval of the "therapeutic" concept of a relationship as
being of tremendous significance in affording a "privilege" to that rela-
tionship.
142. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (em-
phasis in original). It should be noted at this time that a significant por-
tion of the reasoning (though not the substance) of the following correla-
tion between the proposed child-parent privilege and Wigmore's "test"
is the result of a speech given by Professor Alexander D. Brooks of the
Rutgers Law School before the 58th Annual Conference of the New Jersey
Welfare Council, Nov. 18, 1959, concerning "privileges" for "therapeutic re-
lationships." See also Slovenko, supra note 16, at 202 n.87, where this





3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
14 3
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.
1. Origin
It is difficult to imagine a relationship which, by its inherent
nature,144 spawns communications of a confidential nature with a
greater degree of frequency. 145 It is reasonable to conclude that,
in light of the natural and continuing characteristics of the child-
parent relationship, Wigmore's first requirement that the com-
munication originate in a confidence is satisfied.
2. Purposes and Necessity
The next question under the Wigmore test is whether the
inviolability of that particular confidence is vital to the due at-
tainment of the socially-desirable purposes of the relationship.
143. This point has been discussed previously. See notes 20-29 and
accompanying text supra.
144. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925): "The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 516 (emphasis added);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923): "[Liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children." Id. at 399 (emphasis
added); see also Venable, The Parens Patriae Theory and its Effect on the
Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 887
(1966): "If there is such a thing as a natural right in our society, it is
the right of a parent to care for his child." Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
145. Recognition of this fact apparently formed the basis for the ecu-
menical doctrine explained in great detail by Reverend Connery, The
Right to Silence, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 180 (1956):
Close relationship will . . . excuse one from the obligation of re-
porting a crime unless there is some question of very serious harm
to the community which would not otherwise be averted. Thus, a
son would not be obligated to report a father for some crime
committed. Besides being too much to expect of a son, reporting a
father would seem to go contrary to the filial piety. [In addition],
secret knowledge . . . is considered for the most part privileged,
just as it is in estimating the obligation to report a crime. Near
relatives are also excused from testifying.
Moral theologians further agree that there is no obligation, at
least from a juridical standpoint, to report a crime which affects
only the delinquent and in no way harms others.
Id. at 186 (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that in some juvenile of-
fenses, such as "idly roaming the streets" or "truancy," parents may have
an evangelical privilege not to testify against their children.
It is doubtful whether children are aware that their conversations
with parents may, at some future date, be exposed to the world at
large by the parent from a witness stand. Admittedly, there may
be some instances when a juvenile is either aware that his parent
will voluntarily disclose these conversations 146 or is himself willing
to confess to involvement in particular proscribed conduct, 147 fully
realizing the ultimate effect such a conversation will have on his
future freedom. However, it seems more realistic to believe that a
child's knowledge that his parent will either voluntarily or in-
voluntarily disclose confidential discussions would seriously hinder
the child's willingness to confide in his parents. Where the possi-
146. This might occur either as a result of previous contact with the
juvenile court system or by forewarning by the parent. But see Note, The
Social-Worker Client Relationship and Privileged Communications, 1965
WASH. U. L.Q. 362:
A special problem arises in the [social worker-client relationship]
when the client is a juvenile. Should the child or the parent or
both have the right to claim a privilege [against the disclosure by
the social worker of confidentially made information]? In some
situations it might be desirable to protect the communications be-
tween the social worker and [child] against disclosure to the par-
ents. In order for parents to be precluded from acquiring infor-
mation about their children, the value of the social worker-juvenile
relation must overshadow the right of a parent to have all relevant
information to rear his child.
Id. at 390 (emphasis added); cf. Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81,
211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Studies have shown that if this informa-
tion is revealed, the child's already tenuous relationship with his family
may deteriorate beyond repair. See, e.g., COMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW, Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Practice of
Psychiatry, 45 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY 95 (1960);
Goldberg, Social Work and Law, 7 CHILDREN 168 (1960); Note, A Sug-
gested Privilege for Confidential Communications with Marriage Counsel-
ors, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 266 (1957), where the author stated in regard to
the value of social services:
It is an example of activities which were at one time handled
within the family but which now, due largely to the increased
specialization of our economy, are being shared with the com-
munity. It has been described as a community facility which has
developed to promote personal ... adjustment.
Id. at 273 (emphasis added). See also WHITAKER & MALONE, RooTS or
PSYCHOTHERAPY 14 (1953): "Psychotherapy in a 'broad sense includes
any acceleration in the growth' of a human being as a person."
147. An analogous situation is reported in Slovenko, supra note 16
concerning psychiatrists employed by universities. Slovenko comments
that:
A number of universities have appointed psychiatrists to examine
disciplinary cases and to counsel students. Administrative refer-
rals to the psychiatrist do not expect confidentiality and, as it is
realized that a report will be made to the school officials the stu-
dents will usually be reticent. However, the student who volun-
tarily appears for counseling expects confidentiality, and he is
given confidentiality [since] a disclosure would be a breach of
faith, and, furthermore, the resulting expulsion of the student
would blotch the psychiatrist's relationship with other students.
Id. at 189 (emphasis added); see Fisher, supra note 26:
The school [psychologist] has become a modern day substitute
for the family, taking over not only problems of education but of
the inculcation of ethics, morality, etc., and of observation of and




bility of disclosure permeates any conversation between a child
and his parent, the denial of the benefits of a privilege is not too
far removed from the denial of the benefits of parents. 148 Even
the most ardent supporter of the pre-Gault juvenile system would
have to admit that such a denial is undesirable.149 Therefore, Wig-
more's second requirement that the particular confidence be vital
to the due attainment of the socially-desirable purposes of the re-
lationship is satisfied. Wigmore's third requirement, that the child-
parent relationship be one that should be fostered, has already
been discussed and answered affirmatively. 150 It is necessary,
therefore, to focus the scope of the examination on the last, and
most difficult,15' question posed by Wigmore.
3. Injury v. Benefit
Wigmore's fourth question is whether, because of forced dis-
closure, the expected injury' 52 to the child-parent relationship
is greater than the expected benefit to justice that may occur con-
comitantly to that expected injury.
Breaking this question into its component parts, the first factor
to be determined is the "expected injury" to the child-parent rela-
tionship. Initially, there will be a breakdown of confidence and
148. See Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328
(1876) (where it was contended that there is a constitutional limitation
on the state's power to interfere in the child-parent relationship). Fur-
thermore, if the juvenile, after being informed of his rights, is truly
willing to confess to his involvement in certain proscribed conduct, it does
not seem unreasonable to assume that he would make that confession to
the judge at the delinquency hearing. Welch, Fundamental Fairness In a
Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653, 688 (1966). But see United
States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1967) (where a statutory limi-
tation against unreasonable detention of juveniles was recognized to be the
practical equivalent of the Miranda requirements for criminal cases); cf.
Urbasek v. People, 76 Ill. App. 2d 375, 222 N.E.2d 233 (1960).
149. See Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46
A.B.A.J. 1206 (1960):
Yet while a confession is thus of consummate importance, it must
by all means be voluntary if the court is to be helpful, not merely
punitive [because] to 'wring a confession' from a child is both
unfair and unavailing.
Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
150. See notes 102-139 and accompanying text supra.
151. See Louiseil II, supra note 32, at 746 where the author justifies a
privilege for psychodiagnosticians or psychotherapists under Wigmore's
test.
152. See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRxslL
L. REV. 387 (1961), where the author declared "that the alarming re-
cidivism of children exposed to the juvenile courts is due in part at least
to the kind of justice administered in these institutions." Id. at 392.
trust on the child's part.153 As previously discussed, the basic tenet
of the juvenile court's alleged "rehabilitative ideal" revolves
around the confession' 5 4 as a therapeutic device. It is tenable to
assume, therefore, that if a child is deprived of a suitable and con-
fidential receptacle for that confession, little, if any, rehabilitation
will occur. 15 5 Compounding this problem is the effect that the
forcing of the parent's testimony against the child will have on the
juvenile's view of the entire legal system. 56 Certainly it does
153. See Handler, supra note 102, discussing the results of a study,
finding that in many cases:
By the time the adolescent [who has been in trouble] is brought to
the professional [therapist], he has experienced a large dose of
lying, hypocrisy, arbitrariness, and phoniness on the part of adults.
When he encounters the same or similar types of conduct on the
part of the professionals, his reactions are frustration, lack of
trust, contempt, fear, and cynicism. The word 'help' coming from
such a person in a position of power, is in the mind of the adoles-
cent, a familiar signal of danger.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added). According to S. Halleck, The Impact of Pro-
fessional Dishonesty on Behavior of Disturbed Adolescents, 8 J. Soc. WORK
48 (April 1963): "This situation is one of the most important contribut-
ing factors to the sullen inertia and negativism so often found with
[delinquent] adolescent clients." Id. at 53. See also the premonition of
the result of such a breakdown as espoused by Fisher, supra note 26:
[I]f such a relationship is terminated [due to disclosure], it may
well be impossible for the [juvenile] defendant ever to enter into
a satisfactory relationship with another therapist where there will
be some hope of success.
Id. at 626 (emphasis added). Compare Grygier, The Concept of the
"State of Delinquency" and its Consequences for Treatment of Young Of-
fenders, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 627 (1965), reporting that a study of boys at an
English Reformatory revealed that the boys
... did resent the fact that their judicial disposition did not rep-
resent justice [to them]. It is difficult to treat and rehabilitate
[juveniles] when this feeling of resentment is so strong, and one's
own position, both legally and morally, so weak.
Id. at 644, with Finklestein, Confidentiality, Control, and Casework, 10
CR mE & DELIN. 60 (1964), where the author discusses "the youngsters
realistic concern about what may happen should he reveal himself." Id.
at 62. Most importantly, the author notes the fact that: "In the adolescent's
eyes, disclosure might result in referral to juvenile court or back to the
training school or other unpleasant consequences." Id., cf. KEvE, THE
PROBATION OFFICER INVESTIGATES 10-11 (1960).
154. See Handler, supra note 102:
Is [the juvenile] confessing because he has been led to believe
[which may be true] that disposition will be lighter if he tearfully
and remorsefully promises to behave? Have threats of court re-
ferral with potentially harsh consequences induced the confes-
sion? In short, does the adolescent think that he will be better off
if he plays ball? Answers to these questions have relevance to
the accomplishment of rehabilitative goals.
Id. at 27.
155. The ramifications of this inability to communicate are high-
lighted in Rosenheim, Privilege, Confidentially, and Juvenile Offenders,
11 WAYNE L. REV. 660 (1965), where the author declared that psychiatrists
are in accordance
that therapy requires confidential disclosure [by the child] of even
the basest intentions and that, indeed, treatment itself is often re-
sorted to by those very individuals who are seeking it to prevent
translation of their intentions into overt criminal acts.
Id. at 673 (emphasis added).
156. See TnE PRESMENT'S ComrssSioN ON LAW ENFoRcEvs. AND
Child Parent Communications
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
nothing to engender a feeling of fairness 17 on the part of the ju-
venile. Considering the disturbingly high rate of recidivism,6 8
this assumption appears valid. But the "expected injury" does not
not terminate at this point. On the contrary, the ramifications of
the forced disclosure affect both the juvenile and his parent'6 9
in a number of more subtle ways. For instance, assuming that the
parent is compelled to testify against his child, 60 it may be diffi-
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
85 (1967): "There is increasing evidence that the [juvenile court] pro-
cedures, contrary to the original expectation, may themselves constitute a
further obstacle to the effective treatment of the delinquent. . . ."; Note,
Juvenile Delinquency-The History and Development of Juvenile Courts-
The Need for Due Process at the Delinquency Hearing, 12 N.Y.L.F. 644
(1966):
A consequence of the limited capabilities of both the judiciary and
probation authorities is evidenced by the misguided use of psy-
chology for deception rather than rehabilitation. Not infrequently,
the judge plans in advance the amount of consternation he is to
emit at the hearing. This performance is characterized by an
apparently sympathetic probation officer interceding successfully
with an apparently hostile judge supposedly to gain leniency for
the minor. The purpose is to frighten the juvenile into submis-
sion and, at the same time, to inspire gratitude for the probation
authority. Although such a routine may frighten the child, it sub-
stitutes deception for due process and thereby creates trust in an
authority figure rather than the law.
Id. at 650 (emphasis added); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952):
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is heed-
less of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evi-
dence is obtained. This was not true even before the series of
recent cases enforced the constitutional principle that .. .convic-
tions [may not be based] upon confessions, however much verified,
obtained by coercion.
Id. at 172. See also Quick, supra note 133: "One of the great doctrines
basic to due process is that a confession may not be admitted in evidence if
it is based on coercion or promises. This coercion includes psychological
pressure." Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
157. See Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.
L. REV. 585, where the author commented that the appointment of an
attorney to protect the child's interest is "a more effective way of ex-
pressing concern than offering the boy cigarettes on his trip to the deten-
tion home." Id. at 595.
158. See Halleck, The Impact of Professional Dishonesty on Behavior
of Disturbed Adolescents, 8 J. SOCIAL WORK 48, 53 (April 1963).
159. See Quick, supra note 133: "[Ilf you deprive the juvenile of his
liberty without 'due process' you are also curtailing the constitutional
rights of his parents. For under our system the parent's liberties are in-
separable from those of his children." Id. at 77 (emphasis added); cf.
Handler, supra note 102, where the typical "hearing" is described as
one "where the child and his parents are confused, bewildered, frightened
or frustrated, and stand mute." Id. at 24.
160. Since approximately 95% of all juvenile court cases result in a
conviction, that the parent is compelled to testify against his child is a
reasonable assumption. See Rights, supra note 108: "Those who regard
informality as a constructive element . . . of a scheme designed to provide
personalized attention [view] the presence of a youth's parents [as] suf-
cult, if not impossible, for the parent to comprehend and appre-
ciate the social utility of the legal system's placing his child in a
"rehabilitative facility" or reform school' 61 for committing an in-
nocuous "offense" such as "idly roaming the streets at night.'
l6 2
It cannot be seriously contended that such action by the legal sys-
tem will instill a feeling of respect for that system on the part of
the parent.
There are two other courses of conduct 63 open to the parent
upon his being called to testify against his child. Both of these
alternatives may be more debilitating to the entire legal system
than any of the previously discussed factors. First, the parent
may refuse to testify and, therefore, be subject to contempt pro-
ceedings.1 64 A second alternative is for the parent to deliberately
lie and thereby assume the risk of subsequent criminal prosecution
for perjury.165 This latter course of conduct may be appealing to
ficient to guarantee essential fairness." Id. at 285. But see In re Long,
184 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966) (implying that a waiver of the right to counsel
by the juvenile's parents is binding on the juvenile).
161. See Rights, supra note 108: "Once a boy has entered the delin-
quency facility and become exposed to prison-like surroundings and
criminally-oriented inmates, the contamination . .. may never be re-
versed." Id. at 303 (emphasis added); Halleck, The Impact of Professional
Dishonesty on Behavior of Disturbed Adolescents, 8 J. SOCIAL WORK 48, 51
(April 1953), where the author commented that such attempted "rehabili-
tation" is not only futile, but, in many instances, will precipitate future
antisocial behavior.
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-14(k) (1959). See Quick, supra note 133,
where punishment for such "offenses" was denominated "fantastic and the
product of an agrarian economy, where each child, during the time he is
not in school, is supposed to work from sunrise to sunset." Id. at 87.
163. See Bridgman, The Lawyer and the Marriage Counselor Pari Pass
v. Partners in More Effective Service to Ailing Marriages, 4 KAN. L. Rv.
546 (1956):
The law's handling of this huge segment of [social conduct] is
beset with anachronisms, inconsistencies, evasions, and meaningless
rituals. Perjury is invited. Reconciliations are thwarted. So con-
suming is its passion for facts that the law neglects the realities
of inter-personal adjustments in a [family].
Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
164. There is a possibility that the parent might be able to claim the
"privilege against self-incrimination" himself, upon questioning as to the
contents of his conversations with his child, by claiming that to testify
would put him in jeopardy of incriminating himself of the crime of "mis-
prision of a felony." This somewhat technical claim of the privilege would
only apply in a situation where the child's conduct constituted what would
be otherwise a felony. However, the relative infrequency of opportuni-
ties to claim the privilege does not ipso facto mean that the privilege is
impotent. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 148-5 (1953).
165. See Franklin, The Encyclopediste Origin and Meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, 15 LAW. GUILD REv. 41 (1955), discussing the early conti-
nental rule that all information must be disclosed:
The ferocious legislation which first enacted this law, demands
... the sacrifice of all feelings of nature, of all the sentiments of
humanity; breaks the ties of gratitude and honor; makes obedi-
ence to the law consist in a dereliction of every principle that gives
dignity to man, and leaves the unfortunate wretch, who has
himself been guilty of no offence, to decide between a life of
infamy and self-reproach, or a death of dishonor. Dreadful as
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a dedicated parent who is aware that there is no other practical
or factual basis for an adverse decision other than his testimony.16
This may be particularly true if the specific charge against his
child is considered by the parent to be minor in nature. The effect
of such perjurious testimony on a child, who has already per-
formed antisocial conduct, can only be a feeling that the penalties
of the system can be avoided by further unlawful conduct. Thus,
a child could conclude that two wrongs do make a right. Instead of
rehabilitating the juvenile, the juvenile court system might cause
the child to resent the system itself, to resent the fact that his
parent might have revealed the child's incriminating statements,
to become prematurely aware that sometimes crime does pay, and
finally, to possibly bring about the commission of a perjury by an
otherwise innocent person.
167
this picture is, the original is found in the law of accessories after
the fact. If the father commits treason, the son must abandon
[the country] or deliver him up to the executioner. If the son be
guilty of a crime, the stern dictates of our law require, that his
parent .. . should barbarously discover his retreat. . . . [Thus]
men are required to be faithless, treacherous, unnatural and cruel,
in order to prove that they are good citizens, and worthy members
of society.
Id. at 46 (quoting LrNGSTOu, A SYSTEM OF PENaL LAW FOR THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA 14 (1833)) (emphasis added).
In an almost identical situation commented upon in Note, supra note
5, one critic stated:
Consider that a wife called to testify against her husband is faced
with three alternatives: she can refuse to testify and be subject
to contempt proceedings; testify, and possibly condemn her hus-
band, or lie and accept the risk of prosecution for perjury. A
consideration of this trilemma makes manifest the protection [of
the relationship] and [natural] repugnance considerations, and
also suggests the possibility that the courts may have drawn the
privilege in the interests of protecting themselves from perjured
or colored testimony.
Id. at 210.
166. See Louisell II, supra note 32:
It is just such situations, where there is lacking the possibility of
the truth of testimony, that occasion the gravest temptation to
perjury by the holder of the secret. This is apparently why in the
legal thought of a number of European countries, emphasis is
placed upon the moral importance of refraining from coercion of
witnesses as matters of conscience. Such coercion, in the face of
conflicting concepts of loyalty and duty, is considered to be produc-
tive of perjury.
Id. at 750.
167. Id. The author declared that any potential value to the admin-
istration of justice brought about by such practices is "over-balanced by:
(1) the inducement to perjury inherent in such attempts, and (2) the
harm to the human personality, and hence to freedom, in governmental
forcing of a serious conflict of conscience." Id., cf. Brosman, Edward Liv-
ingston and Spousal Testimony in Louisiana, 11 TULANE L. REV. 243 (1937):
Article 2260 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 ... Provided as
follows: ". . . IT]he husband cannot be a witness either for or
The next component of Wigmore's fourth question requiring
analysis is the "expected benefit to justice" that will inure if the
privilege is not recognized; that is, what "benefits" are derived
from the present practice of compelling disclosure? The most
frequently raised argument against the privilege, or any other
change in the juvenile court system, is that since "in the over-
whelming majority of cases the basic facts are not in dispute [as
evidenced by the fact that] the adolescents and the parents rarely,
if ever, challenge the findings,"' 16 the compelling of a parent to
testify "may be not only a highly convenient aid to accurate fact
finding, but in some instances the sine qua non of discovery of
the full truth.' 169 The present day veracity of this contention,
however, is quite suspect as a result of Gault.170 There is no
against his wife, nor the wife for or against the husband; neither
can ascendants with respect to their descendants, nor descendants
with respect to their ascendants.
Id. at 254 n.45 (emphasis added). See also Leon v. Bouillet, 21 La. Ann.
651 (1869); Tulley v. Alexander, 11 La. Ann. 421 (1868); Beard v. Morancy,
2 La. Ann. 347 (1847).
168. Handler, supra note 102, at 27. But see Quick, supra note 133:
Insofar as the juvenile may be incarcerated in a liberty restraining
institution for conduct which may not even closely approach crimi-
nal conduct, it may be argued he should be entitled to more 'due
process' in the fact-finding process than the adult criminal. As
has been stated some of the rules of constitutional due process
are for the protection of the integrity of the judicial process, and
are irrelevant to the fact-finding process in any other respect.
Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
In addition, it is important to note that the juvenile's right to coun-
sel, provided by Gault, should have a tremendous effect on these heretofore
unchallenged findings. See Rights, supra note 108:
The lawyer . .. performs an indispensable role in advising the
youth who has admitted the charge made against him [because],
in the first place, the confession may be inadmissible as illegally
obtained ... [or] a youth may be unaware of an available defense
to the charge against him. Or-unable to comprehend a charge-
may admit an offense which he did not in fact commit.
Id. at 322 (emphasis added); Evans, The Constitutional Rights of Juvenile-
or Parens Patriae v. Due Process, 4 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 152 (1966): "Cer-
tainly if a child is not competent to testify in adult court, extra-judicial
admissions made while in juvenile court custody could hardly be admissible
in subsequent criminal proceedings." Id. at 155.
169. Louisell II, supra note 32 at 750. Contra, Rights, supra note 108:
The fear that exercise of the fifth amendment privilege will impair
the ability to establish a case against the offender has already
been denigrated on the criminal level, and deserves no greater
reverence in the juvenile content.
Id. at 331. The author further comments that:
Particularly in delinquency cases, where the issue of fact is the
commission of a crime, the introduction of hearsay-such as the
report of a [person] who did not witness the events-contravenes
the purposes underlying the sixth amendment right of confron-
tation.
Id. at 336. See also In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631
(1952); Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal, 79
HARV. L. REV. 407 (1965).
170. See Louisell II, supra note 32:
Ultimately, the evaluation of the social and moral importance of
any confidential communication privilege, in relation to the sig-
nificance at a trial for foreclosing ascertainment of the full facts,
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dispute as to the pressing demand for the most extensive disclosure
of all the relevant facts171 available in order to assure that the
juvenile court can arrive at the ascertainment of truth, and hope-
fully justice. It is also true, however, that "without gainsaying
the importance to the individual involved in litigation of accurate
fact ascertainment," 17 2 the "truth"173 is not the only goal to be
served'7 4 in making the ultimate determination as to what evidence
should be received in the juvenile court upon which the judge can
make a proper decision in the particular case before him. Another
"goal" which must be considered leads to the third component of
Wigmore's final question; that is, is the expected injury to the
child-parent relationship through forced disclosure greater than
the expected benefit to justice? In other words, is the social de-
sirability of encouraging the child-parent relationship through the
creation of the privilege of greater social importance 75 than the
involves value judgments, the testing of which ... is presently
subject to no scientific technique.
Id. at 750.
171. See State v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951)
(affirming a conviction based on a relevant but unsworn testimony).
172. Louisell II, supra note 32, at 750. Although hearsay evidence is
generally admissible in juvenile hearings, it has been held inadmissible
when the juvenile is tried in criminal court. State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio
App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958); cf. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161
(D.C. Cir. 1961) ("admission" made by juvenile prior to waiver may not
be used in criminal court); Rights, supra note 108 where the author
stated:
A presumption that the judge can ignore such evidence on the
question of culpability is unrealistic. That there may be other
competent evidence to establish guilt does not allay the obvious
prejudicial effect that such hearsay must inevitably have upon
the youth's case.
Id. at 336 n.293. See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Holmes'
Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 973 (1955).
173. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52 (1964). But
see Paulsen, Fairness to-the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547
(1957): "If the juvenile proceeding is truly nonaccusatory in character,
there can be little need for a privilege against testifying similar to the
privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 561. Contra, Comment, Crimi-
nal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Pro-
posal, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (1966): "The decision to admit a confession
may be the most crucial question in a criminal trial or a juvenile court
hearing." Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
174. See Comment, Miranda Guarantees in the California Juvenile
Court, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 114 (1966):
If legal order is to exist and be respected the subjects of it must
feel that justice prevails. A child may drift into delinquent behav-
ior when a sense of injustice prevails in his view of the legal order.
Id. at 130.
175. See MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 145-149 (1964):
Legal institutions ... are an important element of society, and by
the very terms of sociological theory-the relation of man to soci-
conceded necessity for accurate fact ascertainment?
Compelling parental disclosures may afford the court the op-
portunity to base its decision on a limited amount of additional
facts.176  The necessity of such a procedure, however, is some-
what questionable since the criminal standard of guilt "beyond a
reasonable doubt" is not required in the juvenile court. Further-
more, the relatively insignificant progress toward achieving the
desired objective of rehabilitating the child may be totally ob-
viated and significantly retarded in the process because of the
distinct probability that children will desist from giving their par-
ents all the salient information essential for their proper social
growth. A child's confession of anti-social conduct is almost al-
ways necessary in order for a parent to effectively correct a child's
deficiencies. 177 Although occasionally a claim of the proposed
child-parent privilege might subvert the rationale supporting it,
it is submitted that to totally deny a child the opportunity to claim
the natural privilege involved in a child-parent relationship is to
"win the battle and lose the war."
CONCLUSION
In order to remedy the almost-fatal deficiencies of the present
system, the following statute178 is proposed:
1. Any juvenile who is a party to a confidential communi-
cation with a member of his family has the right to prevent
any family member 179 who either was a party to, or heard
that, confidential communication from testifying as to
that communication.
ety-their connection with crime warrants consideration [and yet]
sociologists have continued to ignore the sense in which crime is
a particular reaction to legal institutions.
Id. at 146.
176. See Louisell II, supra note 32:
The observation made in respect of the privilege against self-
incrimination often seems apposite to confidential communication
privileges: It is far pleasanter to sit comfortable in the shade [in
India] rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about
in the sun hunting evidence.
Id. at 749 n.65 (emphasis added).
177. See Fisher, supra note 26:
The frightened truant with the domineering mother [is] in his
own way trying to drag [himself] from the abyss of abnormality.
That the confidences of [persons] such as these be protected from
divulgence, and especially coerced divulgence in an instrumentality
of society, seems only right.
Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
178. The general framework for this statute was suggested in Com-
ment, Congressional Investigations and the Communications, 45 CALIF. L.
REV. 347, 358 (1957).
179. The only significant deviation of the proposed statutory privilege
from the text of this Article is the extension of the privilege to the juve-
nile's brothers and/or sisters. The reason for this extension obviously is
to insure against the same type of practice necessitating the child-parent
privilege. However, the frequency of its application should be so slight,
that the extension will prove unnecessary.
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2. In addition to the juvenile's rights under Section 1 of
this Article, a juvenile shall have the right to prevent
any person who heard that confidential communication,
without the consent of all the parties to such communica-
tion, from testifying as to that communication unless such
testimony is expressly consented to by all the parties to the
communication.
3. Persons are to be considered "members" of a juvenile's
family within the meaning of this Article if they are:
a. The juvenile's parent or step-parent, provided that
if the person is a step-parent, the juvenile and such
step-parent must live in the same household (for the
purposes of this Article, an adopted child shall be
treated as a natural child), or
b. Siblings by a common natural parent, provided that
if the sibling and the juvenile do not have both the
same natural parents, they must live in the same house-
hold.
To retain the present system, whereby a juvenile has a con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination while his parents
may be forced to disclose the same information which was given
to them in confidence, is to provide the juvenile with only penulti-
mate constitutional rights. Such a procedure has prompted one
legal critic to profoundly declare "that a little impairment of
constitutional rights is no more possible than it is possible for a
girl to be just a little pregnant.'
180
180. Quick, supra note 133, at 77.
